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Abstract 
This article will discuss the intricate ways in which, throughout the history of Race 
Psychology, the “science of race” depended on and reinforced the “politics of race”. A 
brief presentation of the main moments in the history of Race Psychology will be 
followed by a closer look into the mechanisms through which politics underpins the 
discoveries of a “guilty” science and science, in its turn, has been used to justify the 
“innocent” politics of racism and discrimination. Finally, a critical outlook on the past and 
present of Race Psychology is proposed, one that would simultaneously consider the 
many facets of this discipline: scientific, political, institutional and ideological.   
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Usually the question is “who are the racists in psychology?” But this needs to be 
reversed: Who is not racist in psychology?  Psychology breathes the air of racism. 
 
Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994 
 
Although racism seems to have existed as a way of life for millennia (Rushton, 1995), 
historians argue that the notion of race originated in the seventeen century, the era in 
which Europeans met the “outside” world (Lieberman, 1975). In the centuries that 
followed, philosophers and biologists, using different theoretical frameworks, most of the 
times joined efforts in supporting racist practices. In psychology, after its emergence as a 
separate discipline, racism proved to be perhaps “the most versatile and persistent 
theory” (Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994, p. 9).  
 
This article will offer a very broad overview of the interplay between the science and 
politics of race and racism, with direct reference to psychological research. Due to its 
conciseness, this account is aimed at framing a much greater discussion rather than 
offering a detailed image of this historical development. Considering the above, as well 
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as the fact that history itself takes a narrative from, it is expected that some of the 
arguments presented here in brief will not to be unanimously accepted by everyone, 
many issues still being subject of on-going debate. For this reason it is essential to 
emphasize the fact that the present material is first and foremost meant to point to the 
interchange between science and politics in relation to racial psychology and therefore 
invite all interested readers to explore further this immensely important issue.      
   
When conceptualizing race and racial differences, science assumes a position of 
neutrality and objectivity. Positivism works to obscure any ideological construction of 
race or political agenda (Ahmed, 2008). However, research is in itself a social act 
and there is no such thing as a “view from nowhere” (Jovchelovitch, 2007) in the 
production of knowledge. 
 
“The truth surely is that any analysis of the nature of a society’s ills is implicitly 
ideological. It is not being ideological which is the scientific sin here, but the 
masquerade of not being ideological” (Richards, 1997, p. 277).    
 
This state of affaires is especially problematic for the psychological research of race. 
Although racism is definitely not a thing of the past, psychology continues to treat 
this sensitive issue “as something apart from itself, something the discipline studies, 
and not what it does” (Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994, p. 8). Since race is not a 
biological but a sociocultural category (Rose et al., 1984; Spears, 1999) the 
importance it has been given in “scientific” psychology can only be justified by 
political and ideological reasons. Looking especially at blackness in Western 
societies, the first section will highlight some significant moments in the history of 
Race Psychology.  
 
The Long Past and Short History of Race Psychology  
 
It may be argued that although Race Psychology as a discipline had been a 
product of the first half of the twentieth century, its origins can be traced far before. 
In fact, “remarkable continuities” of race and racism in psychology and connected 
disciplines reverberate up to the present day (Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994). 
 
For centuries Europe has been dominated by the traditional Christian cosmology 
assuming the unity of ‘mankind’ as descending from Noah’s sons (Rushton, 1995). This 
also helped to explain physical differences between Europeans, Asians and Africans. 
But the Biblical story is in fact a myth of degeneration in which Ham’s black skinned 
sons had been cursed for their father’s sin (Richards, 1997). 
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Early science disregarded this justification and proposed its own terminology, 
starting, in 1735, with the concept of race and C. Linnaeus’s distinction between four 
human varieties: white, black, red and yellow (Tucker, 1994).  
 
The “old” religious ideas soon clashed with “scientific” ones in what came to be 
known as the monogenism versus polygenism debate (Lieberman, 1975; Rushton, 
1995; Gould, 1996). While the first argued for the scriptural unity of mankind, the 
second, taking shape in the slave-owning America, envisioned a world of different 
human species. Although seemingly different, both hypotheses started from the 
basic assumption that white people are superior to all others. 
 
It was during the second half of the nineteen century that “scientific racism” found 
its two main pillars in the evolutionary theory and quantification (the birth of statistics; 
Gould, 1996; Rushton, 1995). The new approach brought biology to the centre and 
relied heavily on biological determinism, a reductionist explanation (Rose et al., 
1984) of human limits (Gould, 1996). The discipline that embodied these assumptions 
was named “eugenics” (Greek for “well born”) by F. Galton (see Larson, 1995) who 
consequently made the first attempts at quantifying racial psychological differences 
(Richards, 1997). Many others perfected his work. Among them, H. Spencer is famous 
for his “pragmatic eugenics” which promoted selective breading and the 
elimination of “unfit” races (Tucker, 1994). 
 
This “long past” culminated with the emergence of Race Psychology in the 1890s 
marked by two articles published in “Psychological Review”. Measuring reaction 
time and memory on black samples these materials concluded that better 
performances in “lower” functions compensate for lacks in higher ones, a hypothesis 
also tested by the renowned Cambridge Torres Strait Expedition in 1898 (Richards, 
1997). Another landmark in this history is T.R. Garth, the only author who named a 
book “Race Psychology” (1931).   
 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of empirical studies in Race Psychology have been 
undertaken between 1910 and 1940 by U.S. psychologists, motivated to solve both 
“Negro education” and immigration issues (Richards, 1997). In both cases the 
ultimate message was identical: certain races have no hope for improvement. 
 
Much of the history of Race Psychology revolves around the I.Q. debate (see Kamin, 
1974). Three important names shaped the course of this debate in America: H.H. 
Goddard, L.M. Terman, and R.M. Yerkes. They made I.Q. testing popular in the U.S. 
and turned around Binet’s original project of a non-hereditarian intelligence (Gould, 
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1996). The first half of the last century became dominated by the search for a 
measurable, reified (unique), hereditary and unchangeable intelligence, used to 
rank people (Rose et al., 1984; Gould, 1996). 
 
Parallel with these “developments”, and especially during the 1920s, other authors 
like W.I. Thomas, John Dewey and Franz Boas disputed the race-difference 
hypothesis arguing that race is an unscientific category and attacking Race studies 
on methodological grounds (Richards, 1997). A decade later this line of thought 
became prominent in America especially due to the rise of Nazism. The World-War II 
propaganda portrayed Nazi Germany as totalitarian and racist and this meant that 
all its opponents had to be anti-racist (Lieberman, 1975). In the U.S.A. after the war, 
this new politics became official with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act (Sears et al., 2000).   
 
Would this era be the end of a racist Race Psychology in the West? Unfortunately, 
the “spirit” of Race Psychology as a “racist science” is very much alive and just 
differently clothed in modern times (Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994). For example, 
as recently as 2005, Rushton and Jensen argued that the 15 to 18 points in I.Q. that 
separate blacks and whites stand their ground as they did when first measured. They 
consider this difference as largely heritable, and resting in brain size differences. 
 
Why do these claims tend to “recur every few years with a predictable and 
depressing regularity” (Gould, 1996, p. 27)? To answer this question we have to turn 
to the intricate relationship between science, politics, ideology and social practice. 
Critically looking into the past of this “long-running saga” (Richards, 1997) is the aim 
of the following two sections.  
 
“Guilty Science”: Politically Enforced Knowledge  
 
In most societies science is accepted as the ultimate authority in deciphering and 
understanding the physical and social reality (Zack, 2002). The scientific project in its 
positivist dimension talks about the absolute objectivity of scientific data and 
impartiality of the researcher. Those involved in race studies over the decades have 
particularly used this image as a shield protecting them from public scrutiny:    
 
“We firmly believe that we have no political, no religious and no social 
prejudice… We rejoice in numbers and figures for their own sake” (Pearson 
and Moul, 1925, cited in Tucker, 1994, p. 6).  
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Dissipating the “smoke-screen” hiding the racism (Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994) 
of the pre-history and history of Race Psychology, it becomes clear that one of its 
main “engines” is political. Science is socially embedded in the sense that it has both 
social determinants and functions (Rose et al., 1984). In the almost special case of 
psychology, ideology not only guides the interpretation of available data but it also 
determines the very data a scientist looks for (Richards, 1997). 
 
Initially the political agenda enforcing scientific efforts has been set by colonialism 
and slavery. This is how, from early beginnings, the myth of African dependency was 
born and with it the image of blacks as children that need to be protected (Howitt 
and Owusu-Bempah, 1994). Science found the child metaphor to be perfect for its 
social purposes with just one amendment: unlike children, “primitives” are in a state 
of “arrested development”. The patronisingly paternalistic goals (Richards, 1997) of 
this vision made scientists the best allies of Western political leaders throughout the 
nineteen century. 
 
This strange alliance continued and, with the institutional changes and new anti-
racist laws brought up in the twentieth century, it only became more subtle and, by 
this, more dangerous. The main purpose of the “scientific” Psychology of Race 
became that of justifying social disadvantage. By continually stressing the genetic 
argument researchers have in fact argued that: 
 
“the social disadvantage of black people stems from their biological 
disadvantage and not vice versa” (Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994, p. 7).    
 
A main area in which many psychologists were interested in making this point has 
been education. Bringing to the front what was supposed to be an inherited I.Q. 
difference, some argued that no extra-schooling can cover this gap (see Eysenck, 
1971). It is not hard to observe the social and political stake of such strong claims 
and the vicious circle they produce: by considering differences as predetermined, 
funds are cut and in turn this can only lead to further disadvantage for those in 
need.  
 
Although the examples of politically enforced science are numerous, one question 
soon arises: are we dealing with genuine dishonesty, intellectual naivety or 
unthinking conformity? (Richards, 1997). Gould’s (1996) work is enlightening in this 
case. By reanalyzing data sets of seminal studies in the (pre)history of Race 
Psychology, he distinguished between those that un-deliberately read data in a 
prejudiced way (like Morton and Broca and their craniometry) and those who 
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consciously fabricated data to fit their position (like the twin studies of Cyril Burt and 
Goddard’s alteration of photographic evidence).    
 
Why and how does politics influence science? One way of answering this question is 
that all knowledge is produced in institutions (Young, 1990) and these institutions 
depend on funding (Richards, 1997). Maybe the emblematic case in this regard is 
that of the Pioneer Fund and the Mankind Quarterly journal (Lane, 1995; Sedgwick, 
1995). Founded by a man who advocated the repatriation of Blacks to Africa, the 
Pioneer generously gives away more than a half million dollars a year (for a review 
see Tucker, 2002). 
 
In concluding:  
 
“Psychology is instrumental in maintaining the societal status quo by (a) 
endorsing and reflecting dominant social values, (b) disseminating those 
values in the persuasive form of so-called value-free scientific statements, and 
(c) (…) portraying the individual as essentially independent from 
sociohistorical circumstances” (Prilleltensky, 1989, p. 800). 
 
The “scientific hell” (Tetlock, 1994) opened loose with the collapse of credibility in 
psychology as a science has been largely determined by the fact that whenever 
men in power need scientific arguments, there are usually enough psychologists 
willing to supply them (Gould, 1975).    
 
“Innocent Politics”: Scientifically Enforced Policies  
 
The relationship between race and politics has been addressed by a growing 
literature covering various geographical regions: Britain (Layton-Henry and Rich, 
1986; Shamit, 1992), United States (Perry, 1996; Sears et al., 2000), Bahamas (Hughes, 
1981), South Africa (Robertson and Whitten, 1978) etc. Most of these show how the 
stories told in numbers (Cole, 1995) are used to make oppression seem rational and, 
to a certain extent, unavoidable (Tucker, 1994). This type of “innocent” politics relies 
heavily on bio-psychological research in the sense that:  
 
“academic discussions of race have frequently been incorporated into 
sweeping and draconian social policies which serve white people’s interests” 
(Howitt and Owusu-Bempah, 1994, p. 3).  
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As argued in the previous section, “true knowledge” has never been passive and 
objective but actively involved in social issues.  Black people from Africa or the 
Caribbean, Indians, Eastern European immigrants and many other categories had to 
be “dealt with” by the dominating groups. “Scientific racism” offered the answers 
oppressors were looking for: inequalities stem from inherited differences (Rose et al., 
1984), there is a hierarchy of races (Gould, 1996) and social action must be taken to 
protect genetic “heritage”. The following paragraphs will present supporting 
examples for this mechanism. 
 
The fact that eugenics influenced Hitler’s politics was believed by many (see for 
example Weikart, 2004). Nazi ideology has found the justifications it needed for acts 
of euthanasia and genocide in the biological improvement of the human specie. 
The evolutionary view of survival of the fittest made immoral means (like artificial 
selection) pale in comparison to the supreme goal. Competition and conflict 
became the natural state, things to be valued by right-wing racists. Under these 
conditions, actions towards a programme of “race hygiene” (Howitt and Owusu-
Bempah, 1994; Weingart, 1989) soon followed and Hitler’s personal political agenda 
against certain populations (Jews, Gypsies etc.) completed the scheme and 
oriented practical action. 
 
In the years preceding World War II similar “scientific” ideas were helping politicians 
to deal with “inferior races” on the other side of the Atlantic as well. After Yerkes 
persuaded the U.S. army in World War I to test 1.75 million men and discovered an 
unsatisfactory mental age of 13 (Gould, 1996), strict immigration politics became a 
major concern. Psychologists offered their conclusion: there is a decline in 
intelligence due to the fact that “low-quality” immigrants from each race reach 
America. Everyone’s attention turned towards immigration law and the government 
took “scientific” evidence seriously reducing yearly quotas for different nations 
through the 1924 Restriction Act. Nordic blood was supposed to be of the highest 
quality, followed from a distance by Alpine and Mediterranean (Kamin, 1974). As a 
consequence, hundreds of thousands were killed by Nazi persecution, being denied 
admission to the Unites States.  
 
The main problem with the interpretation of I.Q. testing was that of assuming that it 
represented the real level of intelligence and that this level is inherited and basically 
fixed. Even more, I.Q. was considered to predict the future of the person (Gould, 
1996) as well as his/her capacity to learn (Eysenck, 1971). For this reason, in the 
eugenics era, universal education was considered simply a waste of resources 
(Tucker, 1994). Racist politics never stopped relying on racist science. In the 1920s for 
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example, authors like C. Cannon found that 89 percent of Blacks tested were 
“morons” and argued that: 
 
“a public school system, preparing for life young people of a race, 50 percent 
of whom never reach a mental age of 10, is a system yet to be perfected” 
(cited in Gould, 1996, p. 261). 
 
Similar arguments are found also in Jensen’s articles, with further indications for 
blacks to be educated “for the more mechanical tasks to which their genes 
predisposed them” (in Rose et al., 1984, p. 19). Unfortunately, in what education is 
concerned, the ethos of Race Psychology has not run out to the present day.   
 
Reforming the Psychology of Race / Racism  
 
It is said that those who forget history are condemned to repeat it. It has certainly 
been the case of psychology where, although the obsession with racial differences 
contributed nothing to the understanding of cognition (Tucker, 1994), it continues to 
haunt the discipline. As Howitt and Owusu-Bempah (1994) explain, this happens 
because psychology hardly takes racism seriously. Continuing their argument, the 
two authors show that this problem is so pervasive because “psychology’s racism 
reflects the complex racist society of which it is part” (idem, p. 1). Any serious effort 
to at least diminish racism must first consider changes in social structure and power 
relations (Lieberman, 1975; Spears, 1999). 
 
In the past years there has been an increased awareness of this difficulty among 
psychologists as well as an active search for solutions such as: more rigorous 
evaluation of counterfactual claims (Tetlock, 1994), researchers’ recognition of their 
preferences (Gould, 1996), individual and collective reflexivity and responsibility in 
the act of teaching and research (Ahmed, 2008). The focus on reflexivity is central to 
a Critical (Social) Psychology of Racism / Anti-racism (Howarth and Hook, 2005), an 
approach interested to reveal exactly how Race is socially constructed in scientific 
research and social practices in ways that perpetuate oppressive power relations 
(Ahmed, 2008).   
  
In line with this more recent perspective and the arguments put forward in this article 
concerning the link between science and politics, I conclude that the history of 
Race Psychology has traditionally been presented as disconnected from its 
institutional, political and ideological functions (see Figure 1).  
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FIGURE 1. A non-critical understanding of Race Psychology  
 
In order to demythologize science as a “truth-making machine” (Gould, 1975), we 
have to recognize the circular relation between science and politics in the history of 
Race / Racism / Anti-racism Psychology and also the specific nature of these 
connections. More precisely, how scientific knowledge becomes institutionalized 
and socio-political charged ideologies guide scientific thought (Willingham, 1986). As 
suggested in Figure 2, this approach would correspond to a Critical outlook on Race 
Psychology, past and present. The process of addressing simultaneously Race and 
“racism” as science, politics, institutionalization and ideology is an ongoing one, 
never fully completed, always in the making (Hook and Howarth, 2005).     
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FIGURE 2. A critical understanding of Race Psychology  
 
As Rose et al. (1984) recommended, scientists should ask themselves two questions: if 
their theories are true and how are they socially and politically embedded. Darwin 
intuitively perceived this interplay between science and society and, foreseeing the 
future, said that “if the misery of our poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but 
by our institutions, great is our sin” (cited in Gould, 1996, p. 27). From a critical 
perspective the first question that needs to be asked would be: What if this misery is 
caused by our science?  
 
References 
 
Ahmed, B. (2008). Teaching Critical Psychology of ‘Race’ issues: Problems in Promoting 
Anti-racist Practice. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 18, pp.  
54–67. 
 
Cole, K.C. (1995). Innumeracy. In R. Jacoby and N. Glauberman (eds.), The Bell Curve 
Debate. United States: Times Books, pp.  73-81.  
 
Eysenck, H.J. (1971). Race, Intelligence and Education. London: Temple Smith.  
 
Garth, T.R. (1931). Race Psychology: A Study of Racial Mental Differences. London: 
McGraw-Hill Publishing.  
 
The 
Science 
of Race 
The 
Politics of 
Race 
The Critical 
Psychology of 
Race 
Institutionalization 
Ideology  
  
Race Psychology 
 
 
93 
Gould, S.J. (1975). Racist Arguments and IQ. In A. Montagu (ed.), Race and IQ. New 
York: Oxford University Press, pp.  145-150.  
 
Gould, S.J. (1996). The Mismeasure of Man. London: Penguin.  
 
Hook, D. & Howarth, C. (2005). Future Directions for a Critical Social Psychology of 
Racism/Antiracism. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 15, pp.  
506-512.  
 
Howarth, C. & Hook, D. (2005). Towards a Critical Social Psychology of Racism: Points of 
Disruption. Editorial. Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology, 15, pp.  
425-431.  
 
Howitt, D. & Owusu-Bempah, J. (1994). The Racism of Psychology: Time for change. New 
York: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Hughes, C. (1981). Race and Politics in the Bahamas. New York: St. Martin’s Press.  
 
Jovchelovitch, S. (2007). Knowledge in Context: Representations, Community and 
Culture. London: Routledge.  
 
Kamin, L.J. (1974). The Science and Politics of I.Q. Potomac: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.  
 
Lane, C. (1995). Tainted Sources. In R. Jacoby and N. Glauberman (eds.), The Bell Curve 
Debate. United States: Times Books, pp.  125-139.  
 
Larson, E.J. (1995). Sex, Race, and Science: Eugenics in the Deep South. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press.  
 
Layton-Henry, Z. & Rich, P.  (eds.) (1986). Race, Government and Politics in Britain. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan.  
 
Lieberman, L. (1975). The Debate over Race: A Study in the Sociology of Knowledge. In 
A. Montagu (ed.), Race and IQ, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.  19-41. 
 
Perry, H.L. (ed.) (1996). Race, Politics, and Governance in the United States. Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida. 
 
Prilleltensky, I. (1989). Psychology and the status quo. American Psychologist, 44(5), pp.  
795-802. 
  
Europe’s Journal of Psychology 
 
 
94 
 
Richards, G. (1997). ‘Race’, Racism and Psychology: Towards a Reflexive History. London: 
Routledge. 
 
Robertson, I. & Whitten, P.  (eds.) (1978). Race and Politics in South Africa. New 
Brunswick, N.J : Transaction Books. 
 
Rose, S., Kamin, L.J. & Lewontin, R.C. (1984). Not in Our Genes: Biology, Ideology and 
Human Nature. Harmondsworth: Penguin.   
 
Rushton, J.P.  (1995). Race, Evolution and Behavior. New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers.  
 
Rushton, J.P.  & Jensen, A.R. (2005). Wanted: More Race Realism, Less Moralistic Fallacy. 
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 2, pp.  328-336.  
 
Sedgwick, J. (1995). Inside the Pioneer Fund. In R. Jacoby and N. Glauberman (eds.), The 
Bell Curve Debate. United States: Times Books, pp.  144-161.  
 
Sears, D., Hetts, J., Sidanius, J. & Bobo, L. (2000). Race in American Politics: Framing the 
Debate. In D. Sears, J. Sidanius and L. Bobo (eds.), Racialized Politics: The Debate 
about Racism in America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp.  1-43.  
 
Shamit, S. (1992). Race and Politics in Britain. Hemel Hempstead : Harvester-Wheatsheaf. 
 
Spears, A.K. (1999). Race and Ideology: An Introduction. In A.K. Spears (ed.), Race and 
Ideology: Language, Symbolism, and Popular Culture. Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, pp.  11-58. 
 
Tetlock, P.  (1994). Political Psychology or Politicized Psychology: Is the Road to Scientific 
Hell Paved with Good Moral Intentions? Political Psychology, 15(3), pp.  509-529.  
 
Tucker, W.H. (1994). The Science and Politics of Racial Research. Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press.  
 
Tucker, W.H. (2002). The Funding of Scientific Racism: Wickliffe Draper and the Pioneer 
Fund. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.  
 
Weikart, R. (2004). From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethnics, Eugenics, and Racism in 
Germany. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
  
Race Psychology 
 
 
95 
Weingart, P.  (1989). German Eugenics between Science and Politics. Osiris, II, vol. 5, pp.  
260-282.  
 
Willingham, A. (1986). Ideology and Politics: Their Status in Afro-American Social Theory. 
In A. Reed (ed.), Race, Politics and Culture: Critical Essays on the Radicalism of 
the 1960s. New York: Greenwood Press, pp.  13-27.  
 
Young, R. (1990). White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. London: Routledge. 
 
Zack, N. (2002). Philosophy of Science and Race. New York: Routledge.     
 
About the author: 
Vlad Glăveanu has a BA in Psychology from the University of Bucharest, an MSc in 
Social and Cultural Psychology from the London School of Economics and is 
currently pursuing his doctoral studies at the LSE. He is Editor of Europe’s Journal of 
Psychology and had published mainly in the fields of social, organisational and 
educational psychology. His current research explores creativity from a sociocultural 
perspective (“Paradigms in the study of creativity: Introducing the perspective of 
cultural psychology”, New Ideas in Psychology, 2009).  
Contact: v.p.glaveanu@lse.ac.uk 
 
